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Abstract
Mechanized reasoning uses computers to verify proofs and to help dis-
cover new theorems. Computer scientists have applied mechanized reason-
ing to economic problems but – to date – this work has not yet been prop-
erly presented in economics journals. We introduce mechanized reasoning
to economists in three ways. First, we introduce mechanized reasoning in
general, describing both the techniques and their successful applications.
Second, we explain how mechanized reasoning has been applied to eco-
nomic problems, concentrating on the two domains that have attracted the
most attention: social choice theory and auction theory. Finally, we present
a detailed example of mechanized reasoning in practice by means of a proof
of Vickrey’s familiar theorem on second-price auctions.
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1 Introduction
Mechanized reasoners automate logical operations, extending the scope of me-
chanical support for human reasoning beyond numerical computations (such as
those carried out by a calculator) and symbolic calculations (such as those carried
out by a computer algebra system). Such reasoners may be used to formulate new
conjectures, check existing proofs, formally encode knowledge, or even prove new
results. The idea of mechanizing reasoning dates back at least to Leibniz (1686),
who envisaged a machine which could compute the validity of arguments and the
truth of mathematical statements. The development of formal logic from 1850 to
1930, the advent of the computer, and the inception of artificial intelligence (AI)
as a research field at the Dartmouth Workshop in 1956 all paved the way for the
first mechanized reasoners in the 1950s and 1960s.1
Since then, mechanized reasoning has been both less and more successful than
anticipated. In pure maths, mechanized reasoning has helped prove only a few
high-profile theorems. Perhaps surprisingly – although consistent with the greater
success of applied AI over ‘pure’ AI – mechanized reasoning and formal meth-
ods2 have enjoyed greater success in industrial applications, as applied to both
hardware and software design. In the past decade or so, computer scientists have
also begun to apply formal methods to economics.
A central inspiration for this recent work are Geanakoplos’ three brief proofs
of Arrow’s impossibility theorem (Geanakoplos, 2005).3 Initially, Nipkow (2009),
Wiedijk (2007), and Wiedijk (2009) used theorem provers to encode and verify
two of Geanakoplos’ proofs. A subsequent generation of work, drawing on the
inductive proof of Arrow’s theorem in Suzumura (2000), used formal methods
to discover new theorems. Tang and Lin (2009) introduced a hybrid technique,
using computational exhaustion to show that Arrow holds on a small base case
1Perhaps unsurprisingly, Gardner was ahead of his time in mechanized reasoning as well: four
years before his regular columns with Scientific American began, his first article for them included
a template allowing readers to make their own mechanized reasoners – out of paper.
2The term formal methods is used here to denote approaches to establishing the correctness
of mathematical statements to a precision that they can be meticulously checked by a computer.
Rather than being seen as distinct from other mathematical methods, researchers in the area see
them as the next step in mathematics’ march towards greater precision and rigor (Wiedijk, 2008).
Consider: “A Mathematical proof is rigorous when it is (or could be) written out in the first-order
predicate language L (∈) as a sequence of inferences from the axioms ZFC” (MacLane, 1986).
The advantages of taking this next step with computers include: a computer system is never tired
or intimidated by authority, it does not make hidden assumptions, and can easily be rerun. A
pioneer of mechanized reasoning – who saw himself building on Bourbaki’s formalism – referred
to computers as “slaves which are such persistent plodders” (Wang, 1960).
3All three use Barberà’s replacement of Arrow’s decisive voter with a pivotal voter (Barberà,
1980). Barberà (1983) also used this approach to find a direct proof of the Gibbard-Sattherthwaite
theorem.
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of two agents and three alternatives, and then manual induction to extend that
to the full theorem. By inspecting the results of the computational step, they
were able to discover a new theorem subsuming Arrow’s. Tang and Lin (2011a)
used this approach – exhaustively generating and evaluating base cases, and then
using a manual induction proof to generalize the results – to establish uniqueness
conditions for pure strategy Nash equilibrium payoffs in two player static games;
they published manual proofs of two of the most significant theorems discovered
this way in Tang and Lin (2011b). Geist and Endriss (2011) used the approach
to generate 84 impossibility theorems in the ‘ranking sets of objects’ problem
(Barberà, Bossert, and Pattanaik, 2004).
To date, the economics literature remains almost untouched by research ap-
plying mechanized reasoning to economic problems.4 The one exception that we
are aware of is Tang and Lin (2011b), whose two theorems were discovered com-
putationally, but proved manually.5 As it is our view that these tools will become
increasingly capable, this paper aims to introduce economists to mechanized rea-
soning.6 It does so by means of three analytical lenses, each with narrower scope
but greater magnification than its predecessor.
First, Section 2 presents an overview of mechanized reasoning in general. We
do so by setting out a classificatory scheme, with the caveat that it should not
be seen as implying a partition on the field: interesting research will straddle
boundaries, perhaps even forcing them to be redefined.7
Second, Section 3 surveys the emerging literature applying mechanized rea-
soning to economics. We structure this survey primarily according to the problem
domain within economics, referring only secondarily to our classificatory scheme.
We do this to focus on the economic insights – primarily within social choice and
auction theory – made possible by these techniques, rather than on the techniques
per se.
Finally, to make this introduction more concrete, Section 4 provides an exam-
ple of what mechanized reasoning looks like in practice, presenting a blueprint of
a mechanized proof of Vickrey’s theorem on second-price auctions. We present
4A recent symposium on economics and computer science, involving central figures at the
interface between the disciplines, made no mention of mechanized reasoning (q.v. Blume et al.,
2015).
5The process by which the theorems were discovered is described in Tang and Lin (2011a);
Tang and Lin (2011b) itself is all but silent on its mechanized origins.
6For more general introductions, see Wiedijk (2008) and Avigad and Harrison (2014). Harrison
(2007) introduces mechanized reasoning alongside computer algebra, presenting something of a
unified view.
7For example, we shall see that mechanized theorem discovery is usually associated with in-
ductive reasoning. However – in economic examples – the most fruitful examples of theorem
discovery (Tang and Lin, 2009; Tang and Lin, 2011a; Tang and Lin, 2011b; Geist and Endriss,
2011) have combined very simple deductive reasoning systems with human intelligence.
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such an established theorem to focus attention on its implementation.
Section 5 concludes, and suggests some possible next steps for mechanized
reasoning in economics.
2 Mechanized reasoning
Our overview of mechanized reasoning distinguishes between deductive and in-
ductive systems. While the distinction has been recognized at least since Aristotle,
deductive reasoning – which allows reliable inference of unknown facts from es-
tablished facts – has been in the focus of the mechanized reasoning community.
Inductive reasoning also generalizes from individual cases, but does not restrict it-
self to reliable inferences; the cost of this additional freedom is that its conjectures
must then be tested.
2.1 Deductive reasoning
Historically, deductive reasoning systems were among the first AI systems, dat-
ing back to the 1950s. While the origins of deductive reasoning date to at least
Aristotle, modern advances in this area built on the work of logicians in the sec-
ond half of the 19th century and the start of the 20th (e.g. Whitehead and Russell,
1910). At the Dartmouth Workshop in 1956, Newell and Simon introduced the
Logic Theorist, an automated reasoner which re-proved 38 of the 52 theorems in
Whitehead and Russell’s Principia Mathematica (Whitehead and Russell, 1910).8
Abstractly, a deductive reasoner implements a logic – which is comprised of a
syntax defining well-formed formulae and a semantics assigning meaning to for-
mulae – and a calculus for deriving formulae (called theorems) from formulae
(called premises or axioms). Historically, subfields of mechanized reasoning have
been defined by choice of logic, calculus and problem domain. This section pro-
vides a classificatory scheme based, first, on the choice of calculus. Following
the choice of calculus, a logic is chosen to balance expressiveness and tractability.
Finally, the problem domain itself will dictate some of the specialized features of
a mechanized reasoner.
When a mechanized reasoner applies the calculus’ permissible operations to
the axioms to obtain new, syntactically-correct formulae it does not make use of
the semantics: the semantics, or ascribed meanings, yield models that may assist
human intuition, but which are not necessary to the formal process of reasoning
8According to McCorduck (2004), Russell himself “responded with delight” when shown the
Logic Theorist’s proof of the isosceles triangle theorem, whose proof was more elegant than their
manual one.
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itself.9 Crucially, mechanized reasoning involves manipulating symbols.10
Thus, mechanized deductive reasoning since the Logic Theorist has seen rea-
soning as a search task for a syntactically well-defined goal.11 Further, as the
spaces through which search occurred was potentially large, successful reason-
ing would use heuristics to avoid unprofitable sequences of operations. From this
point of view, mechanized reasoning operates as chess computers do.12 For a
chess computer, the premises’ intended semantic interpretations are the board, its
pieces and their positions; the calculus specified permissible moves. A chess com-
puter could then test manually discovered solutions to chess puzzles by verifying
that each move satisfies the requirements of its calculus, with the final operation
yielding the goal-formula. More ambitiously, and interestingly, chess programs
discover solutions (e.g. sequences of winning moves) by searching through per-
missible operations, with the benefit of heuristics (e.g. regarding relative values of
pieces).
A set of premises and a formula may be related in two different ways. First,
the semantic consequence relation describes situations in which the formula fol-
lows from the premises: if the symbols in the premises are interpreted in such a
way that the formulae in the premises are all true, then the formula is also true
when the symbols in it are interpreted in the same way. Second, the syntactic
derivibility relation describes situations in which the formula can be derived from
the premises: it is possible to generate the formula from the premises by apply-
ing a fixed set of so-called calculus rules. (An example of such a rule is modus
ponens: From A and A → B it is possible to derive B, where A and B may match
any formal expression). A proof that applies such rules, without any appeals to
intuition or to the reader filling in steps on her own, is called a formal proof of the
formula using the premises.
A calculus is called sound if only formulae can be derived from the premises
that actually follow from them. Deductive reasoning is sound; inductive reason-
ing, considered below, is not.
A calculus is complete if it allows derivation of any formula that follows from
the set of premises. A calculus is decidable if, for any set of premises and any
formula, there is a procedure that either derives the formula from the premises or
9Beginning with Euclid’s efforts to axiomatize geometry, logicians have produced syntactical
descriptions that make semantic references obsolete: Hilbert allegedly said that we would still
have an axiomatization of geometry if we replaced the words ‘point’, ‘line’, and ‘plane’ by ‘beer
mug’, ‘bench’, and ‘table’ (Hoffmann, 2013, p.6).
10That this was an insight at one point may be inferred from Turing’s famous explanation that,
“computing is normally done by writing certain symbols on paper” (Turing, 1936)
11As noted by Harrison (2007), specialist provers have also been developed for particular prob-
lems for which more structured approaches than general search are appropriate.
12Indeed, Newell’s collaboration with Simon began after the latter became aware of the former’s
work on a chess machine.
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proves that no such derivation exists; a calculus is semi-decidable if a procedure
exists that derives the formula from premises, whenever the formula follows from
them (but may not terminate if it does not).
Decidability typically depends on the expressiveness of the logic used: more
expressive logics model a richer set of concepts, but are generally harder to ma-
nipulate. While ambitious exercises in mechanized reasoning often begin by spec-
ifying a suitably tailored logic13, we largely restrict our attention to some of the
best known classical logics.14
Propositional (Boolean) logic: Propositional or Boolean logic, the simplest
classical logic, only uses propositional variables – which are either true or false –
and connectives such as ∧ (and), ∨ (or), ¬ (not), and → (implies). An example of
a propositional formula is
first_bidder_bids_highest ∧ second_bidder_bids_lowest.
Propositional logic can only make concrete, finite statements, but has a sound,
complete and decidable calculus.
An advantage of this decidability is that it may allow push-button technology,
which does not require specialist knowledge in order to use. Once a problem is
adequately represented a corresponding system solves the problem fully automat-
ically.
First-order logic: First-order logic (FOL) is more expressive. First, it can
speak about objects (e.g. “bidder b1”) and their properties (e.g. “bidder b1 wins
auction”, bidder(b1) ∧ wins (b1)). Second, ∃ and ∀ allow quantification over ob-
jects. For example, “every losing bidder pays nothing” may be expressed as
∀i . bidder(i) → (¬wins (i) → pay (i) = 0). (1)
Expressions like wins are called predicates, Boolean functions which – when ap-
plied to their arguments – evaluate to either true or false. Gödel’s completeness
theorem proves that FOL has a sound and complete calculus, but FOL has only
semi-decidable calculi. Furthermore, FOL is not expressive enough to express the
finitude or (per negation) infinity of the non-empty sets of objects.15
Many-sorted FOL uses sorts to extend first-order logic, not to add to its ex-
pressiveness, but to allow more concise representations, and – therefore – more
13See, for example, the judgement aggregation logic (JAL) of Ågotnes, Hoek, and Wooldridge
(2011).
14The 17 volumes in the second edition of Gabbay and Guenthner (2001/2014) make clear that
the classical logics are a small subset of all logics.
15Thus, FOL could not express that only finitely many bidders participate in an auction.
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efficient proving. Sorts restrict the instantiation of variables to expressions of a
certain sort. For instance, sorts allow us to specify that variable i is a bidder, and
variable x a good. Formula (1) is then more precisely stated as:
∀ibidder .¬wins (i) → pay (i) = 0. (2)
i (with the sort bidder mentioned only at the first occurrence) can be instantiated
now by terms of sort bidder, but not by those of sort good, thus reducing the
search space for a proof. Sorted formulae can be translated to unsorted formulae
by converting the sorts to unary predicates (which take a single argument).
Higher-order logic: Higher-order logic (HOL) enriches the expressiveness of
FOL by extending quantification to predicates and functions. It also allows predi-
cates and functions to take certain16 other predicates and functions as arguments.
For example, bids, b, are both a function from bidders to prices and an argument
(along with N, v and A) in the predicate
equilibrium_weakly_dominant_strategy N v b A.
Against this, HOL’s calculi are not decidable, and are – by Gödel’s incompleteness
theorem – incomplete.
Two common ways in which the classical logics (in particular, FOL) are aug-
mented are, first, by the addition of set theoretical axioms and, second, by the
addition of modal operators. The first allows the approximation of higher order
logic while maintaining advantages of first order logic; the second allows logic to
be applied to modalities, such as knowledge, belief, or time.
Set theoretical axioms allow the definition of new symbols and operations on
both predicates (e.g. ∈ and ⊆) and functions (e.g. ∪,∩ and ∅).17 They also allow
the specification of properties of sets (e.g. a < X). Adding set theoretical axioms
to FOL allows it to weakly simulate HOL: functions can be expressed as relations
over X × X that are left-total and right-unique; predicates are expressed as sets.
While HOL is still more expressive than FOL augmented by set theory (e.g., FOL
cannot express inductive arguments), HOL’s incompleteness means that there are
true statements that can be expressed in HOL but which may not have finite proofs.
As FOL augmented by set theory uses FOL, it remains complete by using FOL’s
complete calculus.
16Unrestricted formula building leads to antinomies as discovered by Russell. The introduction
of types imposes a hierarchy on logical objects, including predicates. This disables circular con-
structs such as X(Y) := ¬Y(Y), which – when Y is instantiated with X – produces the set of all X
for which X < X, Russell’s famous antinomy.
17Constants such as ∅ are considered as a special case of functions, nullary functions – functions
that do not take any argument.
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Modal operators – such as ‘next’ and ‘until’ – allow the consideration of modes
(or states in economic parlance). Linear temporal logic (LTL) is a popular simple
modal logic, modelling states in a linear fashion, thus excluding the consideration
of multiple possible future states. Kamp’s theorem established the equivalence of
LTL with a first-order logic. Another first-order approach to modelling states is
the situation calculus (McCarthy and Hayes, 1969), which allows expression of
states and the temporal development of systems in first-order logic by representing
the state as an extra argument of the formulae (e.g., that agent i has £10 in state s0
can be expressed as has(i, 10, s0)). By referring to the state absolutely, rather than
in relation to other states, the problem can be expressed in standard FOL without
recourse to specialized modal relations.
Our final level of distinction is the domain of the problem; this level will allow
us to present concrete examples of the preceding. Table 1 depicts these dimensions
within deductive reasoning systems.
decidable undecidable
logic SAT, CSP; description logic ITP, ATP
computer system model checking program verification
Table 1: Mechanized reasoning using deductive logics
Decidable logic: In Table 1, the decidable logic cell refers to decidable calculi
as applied to logical problems.
Boolean satisfiability problems (SAT) are among the simplest canonical prob-
lems in propositional logic. They specify a (finite) set of statements about a (finite)
set of propositional variables, and ask whether there exists an assignment of val-
ues (i.e. true and false) to each of those variables that simultaneously satisfies all
of the statements.
In SAT problems, clauses of Boolean variables are typically expressed in con-
junctive normal form, conjunctions (∧) of disjunctions (∨) such as
(¬p ∨ q) ∧ (p ∨ ¬q) ; (3)
where p and q are Boolean variables, evaluating either to true or false.18 Revisiting
the example that in auctions the non-winning player pays nothing, equation (1) can
be translated for a finite number of bidders (here, three) to a propositional logic
formula,
(wins1 ∨ ¬pays1) ∧ (wins2 ∨ ¬pays2) ∧ (wins3 ∨ ¬pays3); (4)
18The sentence given here is logically equivalent to p ≡ q, an equivalence exploited by Tang
and Lin (2011a) in their search for uniqueness conditions in bimatrix games.
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stating for each of the three players separately that they win or pay nothing.
Any formula in propositional logic can be expressed in this form, as can any
formula in first-order logic when the domain is restricted to a concrete finite do-
main (such as three bidders in an auction). A SAT solver is used to try to assign
the variables such that all of the clauses are true. For instance, assigning wins1
and pays1 to true and the other predicates to false shows that the single formula
(4) is satisfiable.
SAT problems are NP-hard (Karp, 1972), requiring – in the worst case – trial
of every possible input. Thus, while the logic and calculi involved are simple,
SAT problems may not be computable in practice except in small cases. How-
ever, techniques have been developed so that SAT solvers are able to solve typical
cases very quickly. One application area of SAT solvers are model checkers, as
described below.
Constraint satisfaction problems (CSP) are triples, 〈V, D,C〉, where V is a set
of variables, D their domain, and C the constraint set. In CSPs, the variables
may take on more values than in Boolean satisfiability’s binary assignments. For
example, an hours variable might take one of twelve values. While apparently
richer, CSPs can be reduced to SATs by suitable definition of additional auxiliary
variables.19
The third example of decidable calculi applied to logical problems that we
consider are description logics. These are central to automated reasoning about
concept hierarchies in classification (or ontological) tasks. One of their most im-
portant applications is to the semantic web, which allows computers to extract
semantic information from web pages. As a simple example, semantically en-
abled web searches could recognize that x2 + y2 = z2 and a =
√
c2 − b2 were both
statements of Pythagoras’ theorem.20
Model checking: Model checking (Clarke, Emerson, and Sistla, 1986; Clarke,
Grumberg, and Long, 1994) builds finite modelsto describe computer hardware
systems or simple software systems and then tests their properties. Typical ques-
tions include whether certain states of the system can be reached, or whether in-
formation is flowing properly through a circuit design.
Such models are typically expressed as finite automata. A finite automaton
can model either a finite system or an infinite system if abstraction allows the
infinite state space to be simplified to a finite one.21 Then the model is systemat-
19See Bordeaux, Hamadi, and Zhang (2006) for a comparison of SAT and constraint program-
ming.
20See Lange (2013) for a more in-depth discussion of applications of semantic web technology
to mathematics.
21For example, in proofs involving real numbers, it may suffice to reduce an infinite number of
possible values – which cannot be handled by a decidable calculus – to a trinary partition defined
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ically checked for desired properties, e.g. by using SAT solvers. Viewing digital
computer chips as a set of Boolean statements allows them to be modeled as de-
cidable computer systems allowing, in turn, SAT solvers to automatically verify
their properties. Since the mid-1990s, Intel has used formal methods to formally
prove properties like ‘this chip implements the IEEE division standard’ follow-
ing an embarrassing and costly recall of a Pentium chip that was discovered not
to properly implement IEEE floating point division (Harrison, 2006). No further
such problems have been reported since then.22
Undecidable logic: The upper right cell in Table 1 refers to the application
of undecidable calculi to logical problems. The two types of mechanized rea-
soning mentioned here, interactive theorem proving (ITP) and automated theorem
proving (ATP) have traditionally been equated with theorem proving, but seen as
distinct, with the former involving more steering from a human user than the latter.
Stereotypically, an ITP system could check an existing proof, while an ATP sys-
tem could suggest steps in a proof or, in some cases, a whole proof. In practice,
the distinction between the two has decreased, with ITP systems implementing
ATP procedures.23
The traditional identification of theorem proving with work in these areas owes
partly to some high profile successes in pure mathematics, the focus of the most
hope in mechanized reasoning’s early days. The earliest major success was – as
might be expected in an emerging field – not even a clear example of mechanized
reasoning: in the 1970s, computers were used to carry out the exhaustive com-
putations required to prove the four-color map theorem (q.v. Appel and Haken,
1977; Appel, Haken, and Koch, 1977). Here, the computers were used to perform
simple (algebraic) calculations, rather than to (logically) ‘reason’. More recently,
mechanized proof checkers have confirmed these results formally (q.v. Gonthier,
2008).24
The first major mathematical result to be established by mechanized reason-
ing – rather than ‘mere’ calculation – was Robbins’ conjecture that two bases
for Boolean algebras are equivalent. While appearing to be a beguilingly simple
problem, it remained unresolved for 60 years, becoming a favourite of Tarski, who
set it as an open problem (q.v. Henkin, Monk, and Tarski, 1971, p. 245). One of
by >, < and =. See Burch et al. (1990) for an application to large, complex microprocessor circuits.
22With chip design becoming more and more sophisticated, the reasoning in the verification
needed to become also more sophisticated. Thus, HOL theorem provers such as HOL-Light are
now also used for hardware verification.
23Harrison (2007) noted that ITP may be preferred to ATP, as – in working more closely along-
side human reasoning – it may be better at developing human understanding.
24Gonthier’s team has now also formally checked the Feit-Thompson Odd Order Theorem
(Gonthier et al., 2013).
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the complicating factors of the conjecture was that the only known example of
a Robbins algebra was also a Boolean algebra, reducing the evidence base that
mathematicians could use to form intuitions about the problem. Nonetheless, in
the late 1990s, McCune (1997) was able to pose the problem in a way that allowed
EQP, an automated theorem prover related to his well-known Otter prover, to gen-
erate – not just check – a 17-step proof, later reduced to eight steps (McCune,
1997).25
Perhaps the highest profile success of mechanized reasoning in pure mathe-
matics is the solution to Kepler’s conjecture that there is no denser packing of
spheres in R3 than the face-centred cubic. Hales’ original proof was 120 pages
long (excluding computer code that exceeded 500MB), requiring a team of 12
referees five years to become “99% certain” that it was correct. Unsatisfied with
this standard, Hales founded Project Flyspeck to establish a fully formal proof of
the conjecture (Hales, 2012). In August 2014, the project was completed (Hales
et al., 2015), close to Hales’s original estimate of 20 person-years (Avigad and
Harrison, 2014).
More mundanely, ITP has been used to translate existing human proofs into
formal proofs that are sufficiently detailed that a computer can mechanically ver-
ify them: as of January 2016, 91 of the ‘top 100’ mathematical theorems on a list
maintained by Wiedijk (2014) had been formalized.26 While most of these are
considerably less spectacular than the examples cited above – in which theorem
provers have been used to help convince mathematicians as to the validity of ma-
jor, new results – the gradual accretion of small proof libraries builds a foundation
for applying ATPs more widely.
The distinction between high-profile, major theorems and lower-profile bodies
of theory has been suggested as a reason that ATP has yet to fulfil its early hopes:
Buchberger (2006) noted that human mathematicians typically do not try to prove
isolated theorems but explore a whole theory, thereby building up valuable intu-
ition which helps them in proving related theorems. Additionally, Newell (1981)
stated that standard theorem proving techniques – while often highly efficient – do
not make use of advanced human approaches (as described in Pólya’s books) such
as simplifying a problem to one they can solve; applying the simplified solution
to the original problem may still be very hard, but the intuition gained by solving
the simplified problem may help solve the original problem.27
25Dahn (1998) manually reworked EQP’s proof to provide a more human-readable proof.
26Exceptions include Fermat’s last theorem.
27Conversely, Dick (2011) observed that the ‘resolution’ inference rule (Robinson, 1965), cen-
tral to mechanized reasoning, “was not based on any known human practice and was in fact dif-
ficult and counterintuitive for humans to understand”. Indeed, reviewing mechanized reasoning
since resolution, Robinson lamented that it may have harmed mechanized reasoning by contribut-
ing to a parting of ways between human mathematicians and mechanized reasoners (Dick, 2015).
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Program verification Table 1’s lower right cell corresponds to software engi-
neering’s program verification, reasoning about software systems. This can be
highly complex in the case of complex programs. Within program verification,
traditional proof approaches have sought to prove that the software correctly im-
plements properties specified in the design brief. As such proofs are very costly,
full correctness proofs that seek to verify all desired properties of the code, are
done only for ‘mission critical’ systems (D’Silva, Kroening, and Weissenbacher,
2008).
Some well known examples of program verification have come from transport
and finance: in code controlling automated commuter rail systems, theorems that
no two trains occupy the same location at the same time have been proved; within
financial transactions software, theorems that transactions do not create or de-
stroy value, but merely transfer it, have also been proved (Woodcock et al., 2009).
More recently, a compiler for the C programming language has been formally
verified (Boldo et al., 2013). These techniques are becoming more mainstream: in
2013, Facebook acquired Monoidics, a start-up firm applying theorem proving to
software code analysis; in 2015, another start-up, Aesthetic Integration beat 600
competitors to win first prize in UBS’ Future of Finance Challenge for its ability
to automatically prove failure or compliance in financial algorithms.28
Historically, program verification has been conducted as a post mortem: given
existing code, program verification determines whether or not it is correct. More
recently, code extraction techniques have been developed to generate code that
provably implements the desired properties.
2.2 Inductive reasoning
As noted above, both inductive and deductive reasoning date back at least to Aris-
totle, but the former is not sound, while the latter has been the focus of the mech-
anized reasoning community. The distinction between the two – as well as the
utility of each – was expressed by Pólya (1954, p. vi), who referred to deduc-
tive reasoning as demonstrative reasoning, and inductive reasoning as plausible
reasoning:
We secure our mathematical knowledge by demonstrative reasoning,
but we support our conjectures by plausible reasoning . . . Demonstrative
reasoning is safe, beyond controversy, and final. Plausible reasoning
is hazardous, controversial, and provisional. . . .
28Their entry formally defined a UBS ‘dark pool’ and a set of SEC regulations which the SEC
had found the dark pool in breach of. Aesthetic Integration was able not only to verify the dark pool
failure found by the SEC, but discovered that its order prioritization failed to satisfy transitivity
(Ignatovich and Passmore, 2015).
12
In strict reasoning the principal thing is to distinguish a proof from
a guess, a valid demonstration from an invalid attempt. In plausible
reasoning the principal thing is to distinguish a guess from a guess,
a more reasonable guess form a less reasonable guess. . . . [plausi-
ble reasoning] is the kind of reasoning on which [a mathematician’s]
creative work will depend.
Inductive systems seek to derive general statements based on a finite number
of statements (e.g. if A1 is true, and A2 is true, and so on up to AN for some finite
N, then An is true for all natural numbers n).29 This sort of reasoning is immedi-
ately familiar to us when we reflect on how we form conjectures: we expect the
sun to rise tomorrow without any understanding of astrophysics; this expectation,
though, may lead to the formation of conjectures about astrophysics. However
compelling the weight of evidence, inductive reasoning is not sound – as may
be demonstrated by single counterexamples. In number theory, Euler’s attempted
generalization of Fermat’s last theorem remained open for two centuries until a
computer found a counterexample.30 In game theory, Neumann and Morgenstern
conjectured that stable sets (‘solutions’ in their parlance) always existed; it took
almost a quarter-century for counterexamples to be found (Lucas, 1968).
Inductive reasoning may be used for theorem discovery, whereby regularities
in observed data are used to form conjectures to test.31
Mechanized inductive reasoning dates back to two systems built in the 1970s
and 1980s to discover new conjectures, AM (Automated Mathematician) (Lenat,
1976) and Eurisko (Lenat, 1983). These were able to detect conjectures such as the
unique prime factorization theorem and Goldbach’s conjecture.32 The systems
use certain measures of interestingness for concepts. For instance, concepts that
are always true or always false are not interesting. However, if a concept is true for
a significant proportion of examples (such as divisibility by only 1 and the number
itself) then this is considered as an interesting concept (‘primality’ for divisivility
29Inductive reasoning is distinct from mathematical induction, which involves proving A0 and
that An+1 is true given An. Mathematical induction is a sound deductive method.
30Euler’s conjecture states: let n and k be integers greater than one, and let a1, . . .an and b
be non-zero integers; then
(∑n
i=1 a
k
i = bk
)
⇒ (n ≥ k). The first known counterexample, found by
computer, is 275 + 845 + 1105 + 1335 = 1445 (Lander and Parkin, 1966).
31One of the most dynamic subfields of AI currently is machine learning. Some definitions are
agnostic as to how the machines learn – e.g. whether deductively or inductively – while, perhaps
more typically, others link machine learning more closely to inductive reasoning. Some of the
highest profile applications of machine learning are statistical, positing rules that fit the existing
data well, rather than perfectly.
32The prime factorization theorem states that any positive integer has a unique decomposition
as the product of primes. Goldbach’s conjecture states that every even integer beyond two can be
expressed as the sum of two primes.
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by only 1 and the number itself).33
Lenat’s work was continued by Colton in the HR (Hardy-Ramanujan) sys-
tem (Colton, Bundy, and Walsh, 1999), where more advanced measures for inter-
estingness were developed. For instance,
The novelty measure of a concept calculates how many times the
categorisation produced by the concept has been seen. For exam-
ple, square numbers categorise integers into two sets: {1, 4, 9, . . .} and
{2, 3, 5, . . .}. If this categorisation had been seen often, square num-
bers would score poorly for novelty, and vice-versa. (Colton, Bundy,
and Walsh, 2000).
Another important advance in Colton’s work is that the HR system weeds out sim-
ple conjectures, namely those that can be easily verified or falsified by automated
theorem provers.34 One of the successes of HR was that it invented the concept
of ‘integers with a square number of divisors’ which was added to Sloane’s Ency-
clopedia of Integer Sequences.35
3 Mechanized reasoning for economic problems
Over the past decade, computer scientists have become interested in economic
problems – often publishing economically novel and interesting results, but almost
entirely within the computer science literature. This section reviews that literature,
focusing on the applications to social choice and auction theory. We structure
this survey primarily according to the problem domain within economics, and
only secondarily according to our classificatory scheme, in order to focus on the
insights into economic problems made possible by these techniques, rather than
the techniques themselves.
Table 2 places the papers reviewed in this section into our original classifica-
tory scheme. This classification is imperfect. For example, Tang and Lin (2009)
and Geist and Endriss (2011) both used propositional logic solvers (and, therefore,
deductive reasoning), but used them to discover new results – which we have asso-
ciated, above, with inductive reasoning. Papers like this therefore span historical
distinctions.
33Dick’s case study of the Argonne National Laboratory’s AURA system noted that, while “the
capacity to identify what was ‘promising’ or ‘interesting’ was precisely one of those unautomat-
able human abilities . . . the Argonne practitioners decided what was important on the basis of
extensive experimenting with AURA.”
34See also the introduction of Tang and Lin (2011a) for a brief review of the history of mecha-
nized theorem discovery; a lengthier review is available in Tang (2010).
35https://oeis.org/
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Social choice has been mechanized reasoning’s main point of contact with
economics, making it a convenient lens for illustrating mechanized reasoning.
Auction theory is, we feel, promising as a new point of contact between mecha-
nized reasoning and economics, due both to the technical parallels between social
choice (where mechanized reasoning has proved fruitful) and mechanism design
(q.v. Reny (2001)), and to auctions’ importance as allocation mechanisms.
decidable undecidable
logic
Geist and Endriss (2011),
Brandt and Geist (2016): SAT
Nipkow (2009), Wiedijk
(2007), Wiedijk (2009), Lange
et al. (2013): ITP
Tang and Lin (2009): SAT, CSP Grandi and Endriss (2012):
ATP
Bai, Tadjouddine, and Guo
(2014): description logic
computer
system
Xu and Cheng (2007), Ar-
cos et al. (2005), Tadjouddine,
Guerin, and Vasconcelos (2009)
: model checking
Caminati et al. (2015): code ex-
traction
Table 2: Some applications of mechanized reasoning to economic problems
3.1 Social choice
Geanakoplos’ three brief and distinct proofs of Arrow’s impossibility theorem
– that, for three or more alternatives and a finite set of agents, there is no so-
cial choice rule satisfying unanimity (UA), independence of irrelevant alternatives
(IIA) and non-dictatorship (ND) – served as the mechanized reasoning commu-
nity’s entrée to economic problems: social choice was novel to this community,
yet used familiar structures – particularly linear orders – and the three proofs by
Geanakoplos (2005) gave the mechanized reasoning community an opportunity to
attempt to compare the relative difficulty of encoding those proofs for computers.
One primitive measure of the relative difficulty of formal proofs is to compare
their size to that of human proofs.36 Table 3 reports on the relative sizes of Nip-
kow’s proofs in Isabelle – a higher-order logic theorem prover – and Wiedijk’s
proof37 in Mizar – a set theoretic proof checker, which augments first-order logic
36The easiest way of determining the size of a formal proof is by counting lines of source code.
In Section 4 we discuss a less biased measure, the de Bruijn factor.
37Wiedijk justified his decision to formalize only Geanakoplos’ first proof by noting that they
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by the axioms of Tarski–Grothendieck set theory.38 Nipkow (2009) attributed the
greater length of the Mizar proofs to Isabelle’s “higher level of automation” –
something to which we return in our Isabelle proof of Vickrey’s theorem.
1st proof 3rd proof
Paper (Geanakoplos, 2005) 1 page 1 page
Isabelle (Nipkow, 2009) 350 lines (6 pages) 300 lines
Mizar (Wiedijk, 2007; Wiedijk, 2009) 1100 lines
Table 3: Relative lengths of human and machine proofs of Arrow’s theorem
Nipkow’s formalization attempts began with Geanakoplos (2001), a working
paper that preceded the published version (Geanakoplos, 2005). In seeking to for-
malize the first proof, he discovered a statement in one of the lemmas that required
a 20 line auxiliary proof to properly establish. Further, a relationship between a
pivotal voter and a dictator only “hinted at” in the original text required elabora-
tion. Nipkow did not discover any errors in this first proof. Similarly, Wiedijk
(2009) reported on missing cases, but no “real errors”.
As to the third proof, Nipkow found two instances of omitted material in its
central lemma, preventing him from formalizing the proof. Nipkow presented
these concerns to Geanakoplos by e-mail; both concerns were resolved in Geanako-
plos (2005).39
Both Nipkow and Wiedijk’s proofs were written by the authors themselves,
and are therefore examples of ITP. By contrast, Grandi and Endriss (2012) sought
to, first, restate Arrow’s theory in FOL and, then, to automatically generate a proof
for it.40 Expressing Arrow’s theory in FOL presented the challenge that quanti-
fying over all possible linear orders of agents’ preference profiles appears to be
a second-order quantification as it involves quantifying over agents, alternatives,
and the agents’ preference profiles. Grandi and Endriss addressed this by adopting
became successively more abstract, making the first the most challenging as, generally “abstract
mathematics is easier to formalize than concrete mathematics” (Wiedijk, 2009).
38The advantage of Tarski–Grothendieck set theory over Zermelo-Fraenkel is that the former
only requires finitely many axioms to axiomatize sets.
39Mechanized reasoning can identify omissions by forcing close scrutiny. This, of course, is
also possible without mechanical support. For example, in the matching literature, Aygün and
Sönmez (2013) identified a hidden assumption in Hatfield and Milgrom (2005) – which they view
as “widely considered to be one of the most important advances of the last two decades in matching
theory” – without which many of their results fail to hold. The oversight arose from “an ambiguity
in setting the primitives of the model”. This ambiguity would likely have been detected by a
mechanized reasoner as well.
40Grandi and Endriss (2012) is also a good guide to related work on formalizing results in social
choice.
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the approach taken in Tang and Lin (2009), namely to apply the situation calcu-
lus (mentioned in section 2.1) for the representation. Thus, they could present a
first-order formalization of the requisite axioms, TARROW , allowing them to restate
Arrow’s theorem as:
Theorem 1 (Arrow à la Grandi and Endriss (2012)). TARROW has no finite models.
A model in this sense is an instantiation (or example) of the variables used in
the theory. For Arrow’s theorem, the variables include N (the set of agents), A (the
set of alternatives), the set of the agents’ preference profiles, and the set of social
welfare functions (SWFs) mapping from such profiles to a social preference. In
the two-agent, three-alternative case, that TARROW “has no finite models” means
that none of the 636 possible SWFs satisfy the theory’s axioms.41 The theorem
claims this property for any finite number of agents, and any finite number of
alternatives in excess of three.
FOL’s completeness allows any property of the system to be explicitly derived.
However, the second problem with FOL encountered by Grandi and Endriss is that
FOL is unable to express finitude, for the same reason that it cannot express in-
duction: intuitively, HOL defines finitude by considering the complement of the
infinite, which it can define by induction on the natural numbers. Thus, formulat-
ing Arrow’s Theorem in FOL requires a separate formulation for each |N|. Sim-
ilarly, proofs of Arrow’s theorem in FOL may differ for each |N|. Thus, Grandi
and Endriss’ attempts to use a first-order theorem prover to automatically generate
proofs of Arrow’s theorem failed outside of minimal cases.42
Independently of Geanakoplos’ proofs, Suzumura (2000) had presented an
induction proof of Arrow’s impossibility theorem for a base case of two agents
and |A| alternatives; an induction result then demonstrated its truth in general. This
motivated Tang and Lin (2009) to manually derive a second induction result in the
number of agents. Proving the impossibility in a two-agent, three-alternative base
case, would – by their two induction lemmas – cause it to hold in general. They
computationally exhausted this base case in two different ways.
First, they expressed the problem as a Boolean SAT problem. Tang and Lin
then used the situation calculus, which allows many of the problem’s symmetries
to be efficiently dealt with by the action of swapping arguments, to reduce the
number of variables needed in the base case to 35,973 in 106,354 clauses. These
are too many cases to check manually. However, using the SAT solver Chaff2 they
could show the inconsistency between the three basic axioms in less than a second
on a desktop computer.
41There are a total of 36 preference profiles in the domain, and six orders in the range, yielding
a total of
∏36
i=1 6.
42They used Prover9, a successor to Otter, and – therefore – a close relative of the system that
found the proof of Robbins’ conjecture (McCune, 1997).
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Second, Tang and Lin expressed the problem as a CSP, in which V , the set of
variables, consists – in their base case – of 36 preference profiles; D, their domain,
of six linear orderings for each profile; and C, their constraint set, of the UN and
IIA axioms. As the base case implies 636 ≈ 1028 possible SWFs – far too many
to be feasibly generated – the authors used the (first-order) logical programming
language Prolog to generate all SWF satisfying the constraints of UN and IIA.
Running in less than a second on a desktop computer, their Prolog code generated
two SWFs, both of which were also dictatorial.
A similar approach yielded the Muller-Satterthwaite theorem, and Sen’s Pare-
tian liberal result, among others.43
When implementing the CSP, the authors noticed that imposing even just the
IIA constraint reduced the set of SWFs from 636 to 94. By inspecting these man-
ually, Tang and Lin (2009) posited a new theorem that implies both Arrow’s and
Wilson’s. Before stating it, note that a social order is inversely dictatorial if it
ranks elements in the opposite way to at least one agent; the Kendall tau distance
between two orderings is the number of pairs on which they disagree. Then:
Theorem 2 (Tang and Lin (2009)). If a social welfare function W on (N, A) satis-
fies IIA, then for every subset Y of A such that |Y | = 3,
1. WY is dictatorial, or
2. WY is inversely dictatorial, or
3. The range of WY has at most 2 elements, whose [Kendall tau] distance is at
most 1.
As an example of an SWF accepted under condition 3 of theorem, consider the
function that always prefers the first alternative to the second, always prefers the
first to the third, and prefers the second to the third alternative unless both agents
prefer the third to the second. This is neither dictatorial nor inversely dictatorial:
the agents’ preferences for the first item are ignored; there are only two elements
in its range (e.g. a ≻ b ≻ c and a ≻ c ≻ b), the distance between which is one.44
As Tang and Lin noted, the third case of their result violates Arrow’s original non-
imposition axiom, which requires that the SWF be surjective, mapping to every
possible value in its range.
43See Geist (2010) for a more complete list.
44Represent preferences over three objects as a three-digit binary character, the first indicating
whether a ≻ b, the second whether a ≻ c and the third whether b ≻ c. There are six permissible
three digit numbers, 000, 001, 011, 100, 110 and 111, after eliminating the two cyclical ones. IIA
then requires that each digit in the social preference is a function of the corresponding digits in
the individual preferences alone. The 1-distance condition then allows only one of those digits to
vary.
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Of the 94 SWFs satisfying IIA, there are 84 of the sort described above, 6 con-
stant SWFs (one for each ordering), two dictatorial functions, and two inversely
dictatorial functions.
As before, the theorem is established by exhaustive computation on the two-
agent, three-alternative base case, and then extended to arbitrary finite domains by
the manually-derived induction lemmas. Chatterjee and Sen (2014) observed that,
as far as they were aware, this is the “only Arrow-type result in the literature that
does not use an axiom other than IIA”, an achievement that they believe “could
not have been conjectured without computational aid”.45
Social choice is replete with characterization and impossibility results. Geist
and Endriss (2011) applied the Tang and Lin (2009) approach to the problem of
ranking sets of objects (Kannai and Peleg, 1984), for which Barberà, Bossert, and
Pattanaik (2004) supplied almost 50 possibly desirable axioms.46
Rather than deriving an induction lemma for every base case of interest, they
derived a broadly applicable induction theorem based on model theory’s Łos´–
Tarski preservation theorem, which describes when properties (ϕ, below) are re-
tained in substructures, namely essentially when the theory can be expressed using
universal quantifiers in the form ∀x . ϕ.47
Furthermore, as they wished to distinguish between individual alternatives,
sets of preferences, and preference orders the authors used a many-sorted FOL.
Many-sorted FOL also allows relations (including set inclusion or union) to be
defined on one domain that do not hold on the other.
Geist and Endriss then encoded 20 axioms drawn from Barberà, Bossert, and
Pattanaik (2004) in their many-sorted FOL. As their induction result translated
impossibilities generated on small, finite domains to full-blown impossibility re-
sults, they took advantage of these concrete, finite base cases to re-write the ax-
ioms in propositional logic (using the kind of rewriting that transformed formula
(1) to formula (4) in section 2.1). This, in turn, allowed them to use SAT solvers
to search for subsets of axioms which generate impossibility results in these base
cases; once found, the induction theorem generalized them to full impossibility re-
sults. Doing so for all base cases up to sets of eight items yielded 84 impossibility
theorems from about one million combinations.48
45In private correspondence, Sen has conjectured that the result of Malawski and Zhou (1994)
linking Wilson’s and Arrow’s theorems may be an immediate consequence of Tang and Lin’s.
46Geist (2010) had initially attempted an approach more akin to Grandi and Endriss (2012),
seeking to derive an automated proof of the Kannai and Peleg theorem using three different first-
order theorem provers; none of them was able to derive a proof after 120 hours of CPU time on
2.26 GHz machines with 24 GB RAM.
47As a trivial example, the property that a structure contains three distinct elements cannot be
preserved in substructures with fewer than three elements.
48Resource constraints limited them to eight items and 20 axioms. They derived their results in
about one day.
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Their results included known results (e.g. those of Kannai and Peleg (1984)
and Barberà and Pattanaik (1984)); variations on known results, typically formed
by strengthening axioms to reduce the impossibility’s minimal domain; direct con-
sequences of other results (as they did not prune implications of existing impos-
sibilities); a trivial contradiction between the axioms of uncertainty aversion and
uncertainty appeal; and – perhaps most interestingly – new theorems. These last
resolved an open question in the literature, which we now describe.
Letting ≻ (resp. %) denote strict (resp. weak) preference on individual choice
objects (denoted by lower case letters), and ⊲ (resp. D) strict (resp. weak) pref-
erence on sets of objects (denoted by capital letters), Bossert, Pattanaik, and Xu
(2000) presented a theorem characterizing the min-max ordering in terms of four
axioms. The min-max ordering is defined as
A Dmnx B ⇔ [min {A} ≻ min {B} ∨ (min {A} = min {B} ∧ max {A} % max {B})] ;
where min {A} is the minimal element of A with respect to % and max {A} the
maximal element. Thus, a set A is weakly preferred under the min-max ordering
to set B iff either the worst element of A is strictly preferred to that or B, or (when
the worst elements are equally preferred) the best element of A is weakly preferred
to that of B.
The four axioms were:
1. simple dominance,
x ≻ y ⇒ ({x} ⊲ {x, y} ∧ {x, y} ⊲ {y})
for all x and y, so that a set consisting of a strictly preferred object is pre-
ferred to a set containing it as well as a strictly less preferred object, which
– in turn – is preferred to a set consisting only of that less preferred object.
2. independence,
A ⊲ B ⇒ A ∪ {x} D B ∪ {x}
for all A and B and x not contained in A or B. Thus, adding a single object
to two sets ranked by strict preference does not reverse that ranking (but it
may weaken it).
3. uncertainty aversion,
(x ≻ y ≻ z) ⇒ {y} ⊲ {x, z}
for all x, y and z, so that a set consisting only of an intermediately preferred
object is strictly preferred to a set consisting of a strictly more favourable
and a strictly less favourable object.
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4. simple top monotonicity,
x ≻ y ⇒ {x, z} ⊲ {y, z}
for all x, y and z such that x ≻ z and y ≻ z, so that – if an object is strictly pre-
ferred to another – a set containing it and a third object is strictly preferred
to a set containing the less preferred object and the third object.
Arlegi (2003) showed that the min-max ordering was, in fact, inconsistent
with the independence axiom, and presented an alternative axiomatic basis for it.
Geist and Endriss (2011) presented a complementary result to Arlegi’s, finding a
contradiction between the four original axioms at even four choice objects, thus
establishing that the original four axioms are inconsistent, so cannot form the basis
of any transitive binary relationship.
Geist and Endriss (2011) also presented the first impossibility result in this
literature not to use any dominance axiom.
In cases of interest, the authors were able to quickly derive manual proofs for
the computationally discovered results.49
Finally, the large set of impossibility results allowed the authors to statisti-
cally consider the role of the various axioms. For example, the linear order axiom
appeared in all theorems; the ‘even-numbered extension of equivalence’ and re-
flexivity occurred in none; ‘intermediate independence’ occurred in all results for
seven or eight choice items, but never for fewer than five choice items.
Brandt and Geist (2016) extended the methodology of Geist and Endriss (2011)
by performing an initial encoding in HOL, and then deriving implications capable
of expression in propositional logic for small base cases. This allowed expression
of more properties than was possible in the many-sorted FOL of Geist and Endriss
(2011). Thus, Brandt and Geist (2016) could encode a neutrality axiom that Geist
and Endriss (2011) could not, but at the cost of generating exponentially many
new variables, restricting the size of cases that could be computed.
3.2 Auctions
Applications of mechanized reasoning to auction design and implementation are
less sophisticated than those to social choice. Nevertheless, given auctions’ prac-
tical importance, we expect that these will ultimately become more widespread.
This section surveys work in two separate areas – applying mechanized reasoning
to checking results in auction theory, and checking implementations of auction
designs.
49For the min-max ordering inconsistency, the manual proof is about a half-page long.
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On the former, Vickrey’s theorem has provided a basic testbed result. Sec-
tion 4 illustrates in detail our Isabelle implementation. It therefore complements
Lange et al. (2013), which compared implementations of Vickrey’s theorem in
four different mechanized reasoners.
Conceptually, as higher-order logic is sufficient to express all concepts in auc-
tion theory, it is not challenging to represent basic results in auction theory using
a higher-order logic theorem prover like Isabelle. Doing so in more basic logics is
both more conceptually challenging, and may offer more promise of automation.
In simpler logics, model checking can automatically establish properties of
systems by exhaustively inspecting the system’s state space. Tadjouddine, Guerin,
and Vasconcelos (2009) used SPIN, a widely-used commercial model checker
based on a linear temporal logic (LTL), to verify Vickrey auctions’ strategy-proof-
ness property that bidders cannot do better than to bid their valuations.50 They
implemented two techniques to reduce the search space while verifying strategy-
proofness for arbitrary bid ranges and numbers of agents: program slicing re-
moved variables irrelevant to the property; abstraction discretized the domain of
bids into a three-element domain, depending on whether a bid exceeded, equalled,
or was less than an agent’s valuation. A manual proof was required to establish
the abstraction’s soundness. Together, the two simplifications allowed strategy-
proofness to be verified for any number of agents in a Vickrey auction in a quarter
of a second.
The second branch of applications of mechanized reasoning to auctions has
sought to establish properties of auction designs as implemented. This is of inter-
est for at least two reasons: first, even if theoretical properties of an auction are
known, errors may be introduced when translating the auction from a design to an
operational auction. Second, and more commonly for modern auctions, practice
may simply outstrip theory. In both cases, mechanized reasoning can be used to
reduce the likelihood that an auction will fail when run.
Caminati et al. (2015) used Isabelle to prove that a combinatorial Vickrey auc-
tion is soundly specified, in the sense of guaranteeing that – whatever the bids
received as input – the output allocated only the available goods, at non-negative
prices, and assigned a unique output to each input. Furthermore, it implemented
two parallel specifications of the auction, the first close to its standard paper spec-
ification, and the second a constructive one. Constructive definitions are essen-
tially algorithmic descriptions. By contrast, definitions in classical logics need
only state properties of the defined object. For instance, a classical definition of
the maximum of a (non-empty) list of bids identifies an element of the list that is
50Tadjouddine, Guerin, and Vasconcelos (2009) did not seem to use the modal capabilities of
SPIN; instead, the authors seemed to adopt SPIN as they wished – in future work – to be able
to accept C code as input, and to reason about it; reasoning about computer programs in which
variables can be set does require modal capability.
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greater than or equal to every other element in the list. A constructive definition
would begin by noting that – for a one-element list – the maximum is the single
element of the list; it would then proceed recursively by computing the maximum
of the remainder of the list. It would then return the larger of the two: the initial
element, or the maximum of the remaining elements.
Isabelle was used to formally prove the equivalence of the two specifications.
While the constructive specification is less intuitive, its algorithmic nature allows
Isabelle to automatically generate verified executable code from it.
Model checking has also been used to examine auctions for evidence of shill
bidding. Xu and Cheng (2007) used SPIN to define predicates corresponding to
suspicious behaviour, including pushing prices to a reserve price before dropping
out, and bidding on the higher priced of two identical goods. The model checker
was then used to see whether the predicates were present in a finite dataset of
actual bidding behaviour.
Arcos et al. (2005) developed a toolkit to verify properties of multi-agent en-
vironments, with a traditional open outcry auction as their leading example. Their
toolkit implemented liveness checks to ensure that agents are not blocked (i.e. can
bid in every round), that each bidding round can be reached, and that the final
bidding round is reachable from any other, as well as correctness of the bidding
language (that is, that by following the rules, the system always remains in a de-
fined state). Their toolkit also includes a simulation tool that conducts a ‘what-if’
analysis by performing a complete check of all cases. While the authors them-
selves do not refer to what they do as model checking, that is what it most closely
resembles.
Finally, Bai, Tadjouddine, and Guo (2014) consider the question of how po-
tential users of online auctions can trust the auctions’ protocols. They develop
a protocol for specifying auction designs that can be read by Coq, a mechanized
reasoner. Future work building on this should eventually allow Coq to verify
properties claimed for the auction.
4 Blueprint of a formal proof of Vickrey’s theorem
The preceding has provided an overview of mechanized reasoning, both in gen-
eral, and as applied to economic problems. This section provides a detailed de-
scription of how a mechanized reasoner is used in practice, in this case to verify
a formal proof of Vickrey’s theorem. We use Vickrey’s familiar theorem to focus
attention on the formal proof’s implementation, rather than the details of the result
or proof.
We begin with a standard statement of Vickrey’s theorem and proof, in this
case from Maskin (2004):
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Theorem 3 (Vickrey 1961). In a second-price auction, it is (weakly) dominant
for each buyer i to bid its valuation vi. Furthermore, the auction is efficient.
Proof #1. Suppose that buyer i bids bi < vi. The only circumstance in which the
outcome for i is changed by its bidding bi rather than vi is when the highest bid b
by other bidders satisfies vi > b > bi. In that event, buyer i loses by bidding bi (for
which its net payoff is 0) but wins by bidding vi (for which its net payoff is vi − b).
Thus, it is worse off bidding bi < vi. By symmetric argument, it can only be worse
off bidding bi > vi. We conclude that bidding its valuation (truthful bidding) is
weakly dominant. Because it is optimal for buyers to bid truthfully and the high
bidder wins, the second-price auction is efficient. 
However intelligible to humans, Maskin’s proof is too stylized for computers:
that there is only one circumstance in which changing bids changes the outcome
is merely asserted; the “symmetric argument” is not explicitly elaborated. Before
formalizing it, we therefore elaborated the paper proof, and restructured it to four
cases, rather than the original nine:
Proof #2. Let N be the set of bidders, and suppose bidder i bids bi = vi, whatever
b j each other bidder j , i bids. There are two cases:
1. i wins. This implies bi = vi = max j∈N
{
b j
}
, pi = max j∈N\{i}
{
b j
}
, and ui (b) =
vi − pi ≥ 0. Now consider i submitting an arbitrary bid ˆbi , bi so that the
bid vector is
(
b1, . . . , bi−1, ˆbi, bi+1, . . . , bn
)
. This has two sub-cases:
(a) i wins with ˆbi, so that ui
(
b1, . . . , bi−1, ˆbi, bi+1, . . . , bn
)
= ui (b): i re-
ceives the same utility from winning the item, and pays the same price
as the second highest bid has not changed.
(b) i loses with ˆbi, so that ui
(
b1, . . . , bi−1, ˆbi, bi+1, . . . , bn
)
= 0 ≤ ui (b).
2. i loses. This implies pi = 0, ui (b) = 0, and bi ≤ max j∈N\{i}
{
b j
}
as, otherwise,
i would have won. This yields again two cases for i’s alternative bid ˆbi:
(a) i wins, so that ui
(
b1, . . . , bi−1, ˆbi, bi+1, . . . , bn
)
= vi − max j∈N\{i}
{
b j
}
=
bi − max j∈N\{i}
{
b j
}
≤ 0 = ui (b).
(b) i loses, so that ui
(
b1, . . . , bi−1, ˆbi, bi+1, . . . , bn
)
= 0 = ui (b).
By analogy for all i, b = v supports an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies.
Efficiency is immediate: the highest bidder has the highest valuation. 
To formally prove Vickrey’s theorem, we used Isabelle, whose higher-order
logic allows our formalization to remain close to paper mathematics.
Our proof, Vickrey.thy, is a 9 KB, 185 line file that draws on five ancillary files
written for this project.51 All six files amount to 17 KB and 404 lines – much
51See https://github.com/formare/auctions/tree/master/isabelle/Auction for
the code.
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longer than their paper counterparts. A more reliable estimate of the additional
effort involved in formal proofs, the de Bruijn factor (Wiedijk, 2012), cleans and
compresses files before dividing the size of the code by the size of an informal TEX
source. It thus avoids bias by semantically irrelevant differences in the syntaxes of
formalisations such as languages or code styles using different lengths of lines or
of identifiers. The de Bruijn factor relating Proof #2 and its definitions (including
max) to our Isabelle code is 1.1; as our TEX source is more elaborate than usual,
this is lower than the typically observed factors of around four.
Figure 1 depicts the files used in the proof. Those already in Isabelle’s library
are marked by ellipses. Dotted ellipses denote files containing general definitions
and lemmas that we have added to Isabelle’s library. Rectangles denote this pa-
per’s auction-specific files. Directed edges denote dependence, with the source
code being imported into the target code.
Vickrey.thy
states and proves the two halves of the theorem
SecondPriceAuction.thy
defines transfers, allocations to winners, losers in 2nd price auction
supporting lemmas (e.g. prove that loser pays 0)
SingleGoodAuctionProperties.thy
defines efficiency, equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies
SingleGoodAuction.thy
defines single good auctions including
valuations, bids, allocations, payoffs
Maximum.thy Vectors.thy ComplexMain.thy
Main.thy Real.thy
Figure 1: High level theory graph for the formal proof of Vickrey’s theorem
Vickrey.thy begins with vickreyA, which proves that truth telling is weakly
dominant in Vickrey auctions:
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theorem vickreyA :
fixes N :: “participant set” and v :: valuations and A :: single_good_auction
assumes val : “valuations N v”
defines “b ≡ v”
assumes spa : “second_price_auction A” and card_N : “card N > 1”
shows “equilibrium_weakly_dominant_strategy N v b A”
The fixes keyword applies the theorem to any N, v and A of the given types.
The type single_good_auction is defined as an input × output relation, with the
bidders and their bids as input, and a Boolean allocation vector and a vector of
transfers as outcome.52 The valuations type is defined elsewhere to be a vector of
real numbers. The assumes keyword on the next line states that the theorem holds
under an assumption labeled val, namely that in the vector v of N real numbers,
all numbers are non-negative (this defined at another place as the definition of
‘valuations’).
Next, the defines declaration equates bids and valuations. The following as-
sumes keyword introduces and labels further assumptions (e.g. A is a second-price
auction; N contains more than one bidder). The shows keyword states the theo-
rem: N agents participating in auction A, with valuations v and bids b (equated to
valuations) yields an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies.
SingleGoodAuctionProperties.thy defines the equilibrium concept:
definition equilibrium_weakly_dominant_strategy ::
“participant set ⇒ valuations ⇒ bids ⇒ single_good_auction ⇒ bool” where
“equilibrium_weakly_dominant_strategy N v b A ←→
valuations N v ∧ bids N b ∧ single_good_auction A ∧
(∀i ∈ N .
(∀whatever_bid . bids N whatever_bid −→
(let b′ = whatever_bid(i := b i)
in (∀x p x′ p′ . ((N,whatever_bid), (x, p)) ∈ A ∧ ((N, b′), (x′, p′)) ∈ A
−→ payoff (v i) (x′ i) (p′ i) ≥ payoff (v i) (x i) (p i)))))”
The definition’s second line declares the type of the equilibrium_weakly_dom
inant_strategy to be a (Boolean) predicate whose arguments are a set of partic-
ipants, a valuation vector, a bid vector, and an auction.53 The definition’s body
states that the predicate, given arguments N, v, b and A, evaluates to true if and
only if the remaining expression does. The expressions in the subsequent line
52This can be seen from expressions such as ((N, b′), (x′, p′)) ∈ A.
53The A ⇒ B ⇒ C notation, referred to as currying, is equivalent to A × B → C, but is
conceptually simpler as it does not require definition of a × operation.
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ensure that all arguments have admissible values. Similarly, our first step when
introducing whatever_bid is to ensure that it is an admissible bid vector. The
whatever_bid(i := b i) notation then takes an arbitrary vector and replaces its ith
component with i’s bid b i (which the theorem equates to i’s valuation).54
We denote the outcome of an arbitrary bid (whatever_bid) by (x,p), while
(x′,p′) denotes that of i’s original bid and arbitrary bids by agents j , i. To
satisfy the definition of an equilibrium in weakly dominant strategies, the outcome
(x′,p′) of i’s truthful bid must yield a payoff no less than that resulting from
an arbitrary bid. The let · · · in · · · notation55 introduces local abbreviations,
which can only be accessed within the in block; here, this makes the expression
((N, b′), (x′, p′)) ∈ A more readable.
The code snippet below formalizes case 2b of Proof #2. It is declarative,
resembling a textbook proof. Procedural proofs, by contrast, prescribe tactics
to apply, thus more resembling the process humans use to find proofs. In either
case, each theorem creates a proof obligation, or a goal; these may be broken into
subgoals (e.g. by case distinction); the set of local proof obligations implied by
these subgoals are stored on a goal stack.
Proof #3.
1 proof −
2 (∗ · · · ∗)
3 {
4 fix i :: participant
5 assume i_range : “i ∈ N”
6 (∗ · · · ∗)
7 let ?b = “whatever_bid(i := b i)”
8 (∗ · · · ∗)
9 have weak_dominance : “payoff (v i) (x′ i) (p′ i) ≥ payoff (v i) (x i) (p i)”
10 proof cases
11 assume non_alloc : “x′ i , 1”
12 with spa_pred′ i_range have “x′ i = 0” using spa_allocates_binary by blast
13 with spa_pred′ i_range have loser_payoff : “payoff (v i) (x′ i) (p′ i) = 0”
14 by (rule second_price_auction_loser_payoff )
15 have i_bid_at_most_second : “?b i ≤ ?b_max′”
16 proof (rule ccontr)
17 assume “¬?thesis”
18 then have “?b i > ?b_max′” by simp
54The code snippet contains various instances of “.”: these are separators that improve readabil-
ity.
55We use “· · · ” to distinguish the standard use of ellipses from Isabelle’s “. . . ” notation, whose
meaning we introduce when explaining line 30 of the following code snippet.
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19 with defined spa_pred′ i_range have “second_price_auction_winner N ?b x′ p′ i”
20 by (simp add : only_max_bidder_wins)
21 with non_alloc show False
22 unfolding second_price_auction_winner_def
23 second_price_auction_winner_outcome_def by blast
24 qed
25 show ?thesis
26 proof cases
27 assume “x i , 1”
28 then have “x i = 0” by (rule spa_allocates_binary′)
29 with spa_pred i_range have “payoff (v i) (x i) (p i) = 0”
30 by (rule second_price_auction_loser_payoff )
31 also have “... = payoff (v i) (x′ i) (p′ i)” using loser_payoff ..
32 finally show ?thesis by (rule eq_refl)
33 next
34 (∗ · · · ∗)
35 qed
36 next
37 (∗ · · · ∗)
38 qed
39 }
40 (∗ · · · ∗)
41 qed

The proof keyword starts the proof. Invoked alone, Isabelle would automati-
cally select inference rules to apply. proof – performs manual inference. Alterna-
tively, one can specify existing inference rules:
• proof cases (lines 10 and 26) makes a case distinction; analysis of each
case concludes by showing that the desired thesis holds; qed clears the goal
stack; next begins the next case.
• proof (rule ccontr) (line 16) undertakes proof by contradiction, culminating
in show False.
The proof considers an arbitrary but fixed participant i, which is introduced
locally with the fix keyword, and assumed to be in the admissible range N for
bidders.56
56In Isabelle, the descriptive form of a verb (e.g. fixes, assumes or shows) are often used when
stating theorems, while their imperative counterparts (e.g. fix, assume or show) are used locally
in proofs.
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The have statements establish local facts, generating local proof obligations,
which have to be discharged by corresponding proofs. Here, the cases proof
establishes that ui (· · · , vi, · · · ) ≥ ui (· · · , bi, · · · ). This proof makes use of fur-
ther facts, omitted to keep the snippet readable: spa_pred and spa_pred′ state that
((N,whatever_bid), (x, p)) and ((N, ?b), (x′, p′)) respectively are in an (input, outcome)
relationship of a second price auction with each other.57 defined states that a vector
with one component per element of the (finite) set N has a well-defined maximum
component.
Both from and using introduce facts to discharge the have obligations. The
by keyword invokes an automated proof method, instead of discharging proof
obligations by explicit declarative means. Isabelle thus combines ATP and ITP
methods.
1. simp (lines 18 and 20) simplifies (e.g. x∧ x = x) the statement to be proved.
Line 20 supplies a simplification rule of our own, only_max_bidder_wins .
2. blast (lines 12 and 23) “is (in principle) a complete proof procedure for first-
order formulas” (Nipkow, 2015). In practice, blast either succeeds, fails,
or – giving a practical example of semi-decidability – runs until the user
cancels it.
3. rule (lines 14, 16, 28, 30 and 32) applies the given lemma as an inference
rule. In line 31, “..” abbreviates by rule, which automatically applies a
matching inference rule.
While interactively developing the proof, we employed the try and try0 com-
mands, which apply a range of automated methods, to find the most appropriate
proof methods. Automated calls can always be replaced by explicit declarative
steps; Isabelle’s Sledgehammer tool (Blanchette and Paulson, 2015) can some-
times provide them automatically.
The assume · · · then have constructions (lines 17 and 18, and 27 and 28) list
assumptions then state the proof obligations. Line 17’s identifier ?thesis refers to
the proof obligation at the proof’s current level of reasoning.
Lines 22 – 23’s unfolding also performs substitutions, replacing stated con-
cepts’ names with the bodies of their definitions. Unlike abbreviations with ?,
the latter are semantic definitions, of which the reasoner make use (e.g. sec-
ond_price_auction_winner_def is restated in terms of i ∈ N, i ∈ arg max b, . . . ).
57Isabelle syntactically substitutes identifiers starting with ? by other, usually more complex
expressions before checking a proof step. Syntactic substitution is performed, for example, by
the preprocessor of many programming languages, allowing the programmer to use shorthand
designations rather than writing complicated expressions in full. It is distinct from the semantic
equation of two variables, as in “b ≡ v”.
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Lines 29–32’s have · · · also have · · · finally show construction allows chains
of reasoning with equality before discharging a proof obligation: the “. . . ” fol-
lowing the also have are replaced by the right hand side of the previous have
statement. In line 31, this establishes that i receives zero given valuation vi and
either (x,p), or (x′,p′).
5 Discussion
The decade since the mechanized reasoning community became interested in eco-
nomic applications has seen rapid progress. When Nipkow reported on his for-
malization of Arrow’s theorem, he agreed that “[s]ocial choice theory turns out to
be perfectly suitable for mechanical theorem proving”, but felt that it was “unclear
if [it] will lead to new insights into either social choice theory or theorem proving”
(Nipkow, 2009). However, that very year Tang and Lin (2009) used mechanized
reasoning to discover a new theorem that subsumes Arrow’s, which Chatterjee
and Sen (2014) believed to be novel, and unlikely to have been found with tradi-
tional methods. Shortly thereafter, Geist and Endriss (2011) contributed their 84
impossibility theorems.
If mechanized reasoning is to make further inroads into economics it must be
sensitive to a number of concerns. First, economics has no proofs of compara-
ble complexity or length to significant results in modern mathematics. Thus, the
question of whether a proof will exceed the capability of human theorists to verify
is less of a concern than in mathematics. Further, it is unclear that there have been
any disastrous cases of mistaken proofs within economics; instead, our greater er-
rors likely result from poor modelling in the first place, and coding or data errors
in econometrics.
Second, even when mechanized reasoners have helped identify new results,
economic theorists may dismiss them as unmotivated, non-transparent or lacking
insight.58 Even, however, in the worst case, we believe that a stock of poorly-
motivated, non-transparent theorems generated blindly by computer provide cases
for us to think about and reason with: the presence of the intermediate indepen-
dence axiom in all of the larger impossibility theorems found by Geist and Endriss
(2011) should provide precisely the sort of hunch that sets us sharpening our pen-
cils.
We close by suggesting some further possible applications of mechanized rea-
soning to economic problems.
First, there are open problems in auction theory that seem amenable to solution
by computation (rather than ‘reasoning’). For example, the simplest formulation
58See Avigad and Harrison (2014, p.73) for a discussion of the tension between rigour and
insight in pure mathematics.
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of optimal multi-object auctions (q.v. Armstrong, 2000) defines a linear program-
ming problem that quickly becomes too large to solve manually as the number
of items increases.59 As efficient algorithms exist for solving linear programming
problems, automated mechanism design (q.v. Conitzer and Sandholm, 2003) has
already begun to address the purely computational aspects of optimal mechanism
design. As formal methods can be used to verify the results of computations (q.v.
Gonthier, 2008; Hales et al., 2015), proofs in automated mechanism design could
also be verified by formal methods.
Second, we believe that the exhaust-then-induct technique pioneered by Tang
and Lin (2009), and developed by Geist and Endriss (2011), offers the promise
of automating search for theorems in other areas of economic theory. The for-
mal similarities between social choice and matching theory – including a reliance
on discrete objects – suggests that this technique could be applied directly to the
latter. Although auction theory appears richer in its use of continuous objects
(prices), there is a small literature establishing results by induction (Chew and
Serizawa, 2007; Morimoto and Serizawa, 2015; Adachi, 2014; Kato, Ohseto, and
Tamura, 2015); the possibility of coupling their induction steps with computa-
tional exhaustion has not been explored.
However these tools are applied within economics, it is hard to imagine them
not becoming more important, as the tools themselves become faster and easier to
use, as they gain acceptance within the pure mathematics community, and as the
mechanized reasoning community seeks more applications for them.
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